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BRAND NAME REPLICAS AND BANK
SECRECY: EXPLORING ATTITUDES AND
ANXIETIES TOWARDS CHINESE BANKS IN
THE TIFFANY AND GUCCI CASES
*

Megan C. Chang & Terry E. Chang

**

INTRODUCTION
Three back-to-back cases decided within ten months, between July
2011 and May 2012, addressed the issue of whether Chinese banks could be
compelled under U.S. federal civil procedure rules to disclose information
about account holders who were alleged to have engaged in manufacturing
and selling counterfeit goods. Although each of the cases was decided in the
Second Circuit and shared nearly identical facts, their holdings spanned a
wide spectrum. In Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew,1 Judge Henry Pitman
held that plaintiffs should seek production of the relevant documents
through the Hague Convention rather than compelling production pursuant
to a federal subpoena under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP 45).2 Decided less than one month later, however, Gucci America,
Inc. v. Li held the reverse.3 In Gucci, Judge Richard J. Sullivan ordered the
Chinese bank to turn over the documents sought by plaintiffs pursuant to
FRCP 45, finding that a request made to the Chinese government through
the Hague Convention would not be a “viable alternative.”4 In Tiffany (NJ)
LLC v. Forbse, Judge Naomi Buchwald split her ruling—deciding that one
defendant (the Bank of China) would be required to produce documents
pursuant to the federal subpoena, whereas the other defendants (the
* Megan C. Chang is a graduate of New York University Law School and the University of
Pennsylvania and an associate at a Magic Circle firm in London, practicing U.S. securities law.
Her interest in the luxury retail sector stems from a previous internship at Harper’s Bazaar in
Sydney, Australia.
** Terry E. Chang is the sister of the co-author Megan Chang, a graduate of Columbia Law
School and Harvard University and a practicing attorney specializing in financing transactions at a
corporate law firm in New York City. Her previous journal publications include The Gold Rush in
the East: Recent Developments in Foreign Participation Within China’s Securities Markets as
Compared to the Taiwanese Model, 44 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 279 (2005) and Slow
Avalanche: Internationalizing the Renminbi and Liberalizing China’s Capital Account, 25
COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 62 (2012).
1. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
2. Id. at 160–61. The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, to which the U.S. is also a party, was signed by the
People’s Republic of China in 1991 and entered into force in 1992. See Status Table, 14:
Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L. (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www
.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17.
3. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2011).
4. Id. at *8–9.
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Merchants Bank)
could be queried through a Hague Convention request.5
What is interesting is that the disparate holdings resulted from the same
five-factor comity analysis—a balancing test applied pursuant to section
442(1)(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law when a
conflict of laws issue arises. Looking at which factors Judges Pitman,
Sullivan, and Buchwald disagreed upon reveals subtle Western attitudes
towards both China’s willingness to comply with international discovery
procedures and the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of China’s interest in its
bank secrecy laws.
This Article first discusses the background of all three cases. Part II
presents the issues and arguments asserted in each case. Part III explores the
courts’ comity analyses and concludes, in Part IV, with a discussion of the
attitudes and anxieties toward China that these cases unveil.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CASES
A. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. QI ANDREW
In December 2010, the plaintiffs Tiffany (NJ) LLC and Tiffany and
Company (together, Tiffany & Co.), a high-end jewelry designer and
manufacturer, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) against alleged online sellers of
counterfeit goods whose websites were hosted in the United States.6 The
defendants’ websites included Tiffanystores.org, which sold knockoffs of
Tiffany & Co.’s signature silver pendants (retailing at $345) for a mere $24,
among other Tiffany & Co. jewelry.7
Tiffany & Co. claimed that the defendants’ customers made payments
through PayPal in U.S. dollars and that the profits were transferred to the
Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(ICBC), and China Merchants Bank (CMB) (collectively, the Banks).8
Defendants did not respond to the complaint filed by Tiffany & Co. nor did
they respond to a court order requiring the production of documents related
to their alleged counterfeiting operation;9 thus, Tiffany & Co. sought, inter
alia, production of all records in the Banks’ “possession, custody, or control
. . . concerning the assets and financial transactions of Defendants . . .

5. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
23, 2012).
6. Complaint at 2–5, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.
10 Civ. 9471), 2010 WL 5172567.
7. Emily Flitter, Insight: Gucci, Tiffany Target Chinese Banks, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:00
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/04/us-china-usa-banks-fakes-idUSTRE7931ND201
11004.
8. See Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 145.
9. Id.
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including [bank] accounts.”10 Plaintiffs’ request was granted in a
preliminary injunction order by a U.S. district judge.11 Shortly thereafter,
plaintiffs served the preliminary injunction on the Banks, along with
subpoenas pursuant to FRCP 45, seeking those documents specified in the
preliminary injunction in the Banks’ possession, custody, or control.12
B. GUCCI AMERICA, INC. V. WEIXING LI
In June 2010, Gucci America, Inc. (a subsidiary of Gucci North
American Holdings, Inc., itself a subsidiary of Gucci Group N.V.) and
certain of its affiliates brought a trademark infringement claim under the
Lanham Act, the primary U.S. federal trademark statute, in the S.D.N.Y.
against owners and operators of a Chinese website selling counterfeit
goods.13 The original complaint named the defendant’s website,
Myluxurybags.com, which, while it had been operating, had described itself
to its online customers as offering “an extensive selection of authentic
Gucci, Prada, and Fendi accessories . . . and other leather accessories for
today’s designer fashion at discount prices.” A classic Gucci handbag with
interlocking G’s, made of Gucci’s signature fabric, was listed at $420 on
Myluxurybags.com compared to its $880 retail price.14
Plaintiffs had evidence indicating that the profits from defendant’s
allegedly illicit operation were wired to specific accounts at the Chinese
headquarters of the BOC.15 The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction and, following the terms of the injunction, plaintiffs served BOC
with a subpoena pursuant to FRCP 45 that directed it to turn over
documents in its possession related to accounts that plaintiffs alleged were
“critical to their investigation of defendants’ alleged counterfeiting
operations.”16
C. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. FORBSE
In July 2011, Tiffany & Co. filed suit in the S.D.N.Y. against the
defendants for selling counterfeit Tiffany items through a number of
websites, including Tiffany-Collections.com, Tiffany-Gifts.com, TiffanyJewelries.us,
Tiffanyinsidesales.com,
UK-Tiffany-Gifts.com,

10. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 146.

13. Complaint, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2011), 2010 WL 2719026.
14. See MyLuxuryBags.com Screenshot History, Screenshot Taken May 28, 2009,
SCREENSHOTS, http://www.screenshots.com/myluxurybags.com/2009-05-28 (last visited June 5,
2013).
15. See Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1.
16. Id. at *1, *2.
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Best10brands.com, and Trusted-Seller.eu.17 As in Tiffany v. Qi and Gucci,
plaintiffs sought from non-party financial institutions—here, CMB, BOC,
and ICBC—financial records associated with the defendants.18 As in Gucci,
the court issued a temporary restraining order at that time, which became a
preliminary injunction in August 2011, requiring the third party financial
institutions to restrain defendants’ assets, including three accounts at CMB,
one account at ICBC, and one account at BOC, that PayPal records
indicated were being used by one of the defendants.19 Additionally, the
preliminary injunction ordered the Banks to provide plaintiffs with “all
records in their possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such
records are maintained in the United States or abroad, concerning the assets
and financial transactions of Defendants or any other entities acting in
concert or participation with Defendants.”20
II. THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND THE ARGUMENTS ASSERTED
Upon being served with subpoenas, the Chinese banks implicated in
Tiffany v. Qi, Tiffany v. Forbse, and Gucci responded with almost identical
arguments in their respective proceedings. In both of the Tiffany cases, each
of the Banks’ New York branches that received the actual physical process
of the subpoenas conducted a search of its database and found none of the
information that Tiffany & Co. had requested; they stated that the
information was located in the database of their Chinese headquarters to
which they had no access.21 In Tiffany v. Qi, two of the Banks—the New
York branches of BOC and ICBC—also offered to assist in submitting a
discovery request to Chinese authorities pursuant to the Hague Convention,
a proposition that was rejected by the plaintiffs.22 Ultimately, the Banks
asserted two arguments against the subpoena: (1) The New York branches
of the Banks “had no access to or control over any customer accounts or . . .
information located outside the United States,” and (2) complying with the
subpoena would cause the Banks to be in violation of Chinese law.23
In Gucci, BOC (the only Chinese bank that was implicated in the case)
produced documents located in its New York branch that fell within the
category of documents requested by the plaintiffs but did not produce any

17. Complaint at 3, 4–5, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012), 2011 WL 2883566 at *1–2.
18. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *1.
19. Id. at *1–2.
20. Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. See id. at *2, *3; Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 148, 152 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
22. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 146.
23. Id. at 146, 151 (internal quotations omitted); see also Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL
1918866, at *2.
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documents located in its Chinese headquarters.24 Like the Banks in both of
the Tiffany cases, BOC asserted that (1) it did not have “possession,
custody, or control” over the documents located in China, and (2)
compliance with the subpoena would violate Chinese law, and thus any
request must be made under the Hague Convention.25
Thus, two legal issues are raised in all three cases: (1) whether the New
York branches of Chinese banks have “possession, custody, or control” of
the documents located in China from a legal standpoint, and (2) more
importantly (and controversially) for the purposes of this paper, whether a
request for the production of documents should be made under the Hague
Convention because production under the subpoena would contravene
Chinese law.
Each court in the two Tiffany cases and in the Gucci case quickly
dispensed with the first legal issue, finding that the banks’ assertions—(1)
that the New York branches of the banks had separate databases from their
Chinese headquarters, and (2) that the bank personnel in the New York
branches could not compel the bank personnel in China to produce the
documents sought—were irrelevant. All three courts reasoned that the
subpoenas were directed at the banks as a whole, not solely the New York
branches of the banks, which were not considered separate entities from
their offices in China.26 Thus, all three courts held that the Chinese banks,
including their New York branches, had “possession,” “custody,” and
“control” over the documents requested notwithstanding the documents’
location abroad.27
The agreement between the courts, however, came to an end in
addressing the second legal issue—whether a request for documents should
be made under the Hague Convention rather than U.S. federal discovery
rules due to a conflict of laws.
III. THE COMITY ANALYSIS: SAME TEST, DIFFERENT
RESULTS
In both Tiffany cases and the Gucci case, the assertion that there is a
conflict of laws between U.S. discovery rules and Chinese banking laws

24. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2011).
25. Id.
26. See id. at *4 n.6; Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 149–50; Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL
1918866, at *3 (reasoning that “the Banks’ New York branches are not subsidiaries of a foreign
parent company, but rather are ‘branches of the same corporate entities as their counterparts in
China.’ . . . ‘[T]here is a presumption that a corporation is in the possession and control of its own
books and records.’” (quoting Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 147 n.1) (also quoting First Nat’l City
Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1959)).
27. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *3; Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 149–50; see
Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *4 n.6.

430

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

was uncontested and accepted. Various Chinese banking laws allegedly
conflicted with U.S. laws in both cases, including, inter alia:
 Article 6 of the Commercial Bank Law, stating that
“commercial banks shall safeguard the legal rights and interests
of depositors against the encroachment of any entity or
individual”;28
 Article 24 of the Corporate Deposit Regulation, stating that “a
financial institution shall keep secret the deposits of corporate
depositors”;29
 The Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions’
Assistance in the Inquiry into, Freeze, or Deduction of
Deposits, requiring that any of the foregoing actions may be
taken only if (1) the request for inquiry into, freezing, or
debiting funds is from an “authorized governmental entity” and
(2) such authorized governmental agency presents the bank
with a notice confirming the latter’s assistance with the inquiry
into, or freezing, or deduction of funds;30
 Various damages provisions, providing for fines of up to RMB
500,000 Yuan, civil liability, and disciplinary punishment for
personnel by the institution itself;31 and
 Article 253(A) of China’s Criminal Law, providing for criminal
liability with a term of imprisonment of up to three years for
personnel at financial institutions who illegally provide
personal information of citizen account holders to others in
violation of Chinese law.32
After acknowledging the clear existence of a conflict of laws, the courts
performed a comity analysis pursuant to Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law section 442(1)(c) to determine whether the Chinese banks
must comply with the subpoena, notwithstanding a potential conflict with
Chinese law.33 Section 442(1)(c) requires the consideration of five factors:
(1) “the importance of the documents or information requested to the
litigation”; (2) “the degree of specificity of the request”; (3) “whether the
information originated in the United States”; (4) “the availability of
alternative means of retrieving the information”; and (5) “the extent to
which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests
28.
29.
30.
31.

Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 150.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (referring to Article 73 of the Commercial Bank Law with regard to monetary fines and
civil liability and Article 78 of the Commercial Bank Law with regard to disciplinary punishment
by the institution itself).
32. Id.
33. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866, at *4–11 (S.D.N.Y.
May 23, 2012); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *5–12
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011); Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151–60.
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of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine the
important interests of the state where the information is located.”34
The courts found for the plaintiffs on factors one and two35 and for the
Chinese banks on factor three regarding the origin of the documents
sought.36 However, the courts differed in their analyses of factors four and
five.
A. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. QI ANDREW
In Tiffany v. Qi, Judge Pitman found that, under the fourth comity
factor, a request under the Hague Convention was an alternative means for
the plaintiffs to obtain the documents they sought.37 Tiffany & Co. argued
that the Hague Convention in China was futile, citing Milliken & Co v.
Bank of China.38 The Banks argued that Milliken had been based in part on
language from the U.S. State Department’s website, which had previously
stated:
While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China pursuant
to a letter rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence Convention), such
requests have not been particularly successful in the past. . . . It is not
unusual for no reply to be received or after a considerable time has
elapsed, for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American
court with no indication that the request will eventually be executed.39

The Tiffany v. Qi court agreed with the Banks that the removal of this
critical language from the State Department’s website “implie[d] that the
conditions described by the omitted language no longer exist.”40 The court
did not consider the expert witness testimony presented on behalf of either
side regarding China’s propensity to comply with a Hague Convention
request, since it found that the experts had come to divergent conclusions
based on the same empirical data.41

34. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151.
35. Both courts found that (1) the documents requested were critical to revealing the identity
of other individuals involved in defendants’ alleged counterfeiting operation, and (2) the request
was sufficiently specific. See Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *5; Gucci, 2011 WL
6156936, at *5–6; Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 151–52.
36. Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *5–6; Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *6; Tiffany v.
Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 152.
37. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 152–53.
38. Id. at 154 (citing Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010))
(rejecting the proposition that documents could be easily obtained in China through the Hague
Convention).
39. Id. (citing former language from U.S. State Department’s website).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 154–55.
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Finally, the court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that China’s
Article 23 Reservation under the Convention—specifying that only requests
for documents that are clearly enumerated and direct or close to the subject
matter of litigation would be executed—constituted persuasive evidence
that China would not execute the request.42
In its examination of the fifth comity factor—the extent to which
noncompliance with the request for documents undermines important U.S.
or Chinese interests—the court balanced the competing state interests and
concluded that the Chinese interest in protecting its account holders’
confidentiality was “more significant” than the U.S. interest in enforcing
and protecting the rights of trademark holders.43 The court relied most
heavily on two facts: (1) the severity of the Chinese banking laws, which
had “few exceptions and . . . harsh consequences for violations,”44 and (2)
the Banks’ non-party status.45 The court distinguished a prior case, Gucci
America, Inc. v. Curveal Fashion (Curveal),46 which had concluded that the
U.S. interest trumped Malaysia’s interest in bank secrecy, finding that
Chinese banking laws had more regulations and fewer exceptions than the
Malaysian banking laws.47
B. GUCCI AMERICA, INC. V. WEIXING LI
In Gucci, Judge Sullivan expressly disagreed with Judge Pitman
regarding factor four—whether a Hague Convention request to China was
an “alternative means” for plaintiffs to obtain the documents sought. The
Gucci court addressed Judge Pitman’s reasoning head-on:
[W]hile the Court agrees with Judge Pitman that “there is a dearth of
information as to the current efficiency” of Hague Convention requests in
China, the Court is reluctant to discount Plaintiffs’ evidence and the case
law cited above solely because of an unexplained revision to the State
Department’s website. Without concrete evidence suggesting that China’s
compliance with Hague Convention requests has, in fact, dramatically
improved, the Court is inclined to defer to the authorities cited above that
have found that Hague Convention requests in circumstances similar to

42. First, the court noted that thirty-six other Hague Convention signatories had also adopted
the Article 23 reservation (including the United Kingdom and Switzerland); and, second, the court
reasoned that the documents would meet the requirements of the Article 23 reservation. See id. at
155–56.
43. Id. at 158.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 158, 160.
46. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion (Curveal), No. 09 Civ. 8458, 2010 WL 808639
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
47. See Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 157.
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those presented here are not a viable alternative method of securing the
information Plaintiffs seek.48

Judge Sullivan also disagreed with Judge Pitman’s reasoning that
because a request under the Convention would not be “futile,” it fell within
factor four as a “viable alternative.”49 The Gucci court stated that a finding
that there was some likelihood of compliance with the Convention did not
end the inquiry; rather, the particular facts of the case had to be scrutinized
to determine the “likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove
effective.”50 Thus, the court here seemed to require a higher probability that
the Convention request would be honored in China as compared to the
Tiffany v. Qi court.
In balancing the states’ interests under the fifth factor, Judge Sullivan
again came to a different conclusion than Judge Pitman, finding that the
U.S. interest in enforcing the Lanham Act outweighed China’s “limited”
interest in enforcing Chinese bank secrecy laws.51 In particular, the Gucci
court reasoned that the fact that the protections under China’s bank secrecy
laws could be waived by individuals and certain public bodies (specifically,
the “people’s court,” “taxation authority,” “public security organ,”
“industrial commercial administrative organ,” and “securities regulation
organ”) suggested that these laws “merely confer an individual privilege on
customers rather than reflect a national policy entitled to substantial
deference.”52
C. TIFFANY (NJ) LLC V. FORBSE
When it came to assessing the alternative means of securing the
requested information under factor four of the comity analysis, Judge
Buchwald in Tiffany v. Forbse, like Judge Pitman in Tiffany v. Qi, found for
the Banks. Tiffany & Co. argued before Buchwald that despite the fact that
Judge Pitman had entered a Hague Convention request in November 2011,
no response had been forthcoming from the Banks in the six intervening
months.53 The Banks replied that China had executed thirty-seven requests
for evidence in the first half of 2010.54 Despite the six-month delay in
answering the Hague Convention request entered into following the
decision in Tiffany v. Qi, Judge Buchwald concluded that it would be
prudent to wait before jumping to conclusions that any such Hague
48. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2011).
49. Id. at *7–9, *11 n.8.
50. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at *11.
52. Id. at *10.
53. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 WL 1918866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23,
2012).
54. Id.
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Convention requests would be ignored until Chinese authorities had
demonstrated concretely that they would fail to comply with similar
requests after having a sufficient opportunity to comply.55
However, when balancing the competing national interests under factor
five, Judge Buchwald departed from Judge Pitman’s conclusion in Tiffany
v. Qi. Judge Pitman had indicated in his decision that the Chinese interest in
protecting its account holders’ secrecy was more significant than U.S.
trademark enforcement interests.56 Instead, while Judge Buchwald
acknowledged the letter submitted by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to four judges of
the S.D.N.Y. with similar cases pending, urging that they follow Judge
Pitman’s approach in seeking evidence under the Hague Convention, Judge
Buchwald questioned the extent of the Chinese government’s interests by
pointing out that numerous Chinese government organizations have been
endowed with the ability to override confidentiality provisions which “only
underscores the notion that secrecy laws were not designed to protect
Chinese citizens who engage in unlawful behavior.”57 Unlike Judge
Sullivan’s conclusion in Gucci, however, Judge Buchwald ruled that, on
balance, factor five did not tilt the balance in favor of either Tiffany & Co.
or the defendants.58
Furthermore, Judge Buchwald noted that BOC continued to act as the
acquiring bank for TiffanyOutletStore.com after it was notified of the
preliminary injunction.59 BOC’s defense was that it would be an “enormous
burden” to investigate all merchants globally to ascertain whether or not
these merchants were associated with the defendant.60 Judge Buchwald
rejected this contention, pointing out that the word “Tiffany” was in the
name of the counterfeiting site, which a simple database search could have
easily unveiled.61 Consequently, Judge Buchwald concluded that BOC was
acting in bad faith and must comply with the federal subpoena, whereas the
other two banks, ICBC and CMB, could be queried through a Hague
Convention request.62
IV. ATTITUDES AND ANXIETIES UNVEILED: A SWISS BANK
COMPARISON AND MEDIA PORTRAYALS
The U.S. State Department’s retraction of negative language from its
website concerning the unlikelihood of successfully obtaining information
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 156–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Tiffany v. Forbse, 2012 WL 1918866, at *8.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pursuant to a Hague Convention request in China63 was critical to Judge
Pitman’s finding in Tiffany v. Qi that the “availability of alternative means
of retrieving the information” under factor four of the comity analysis
favored the Banks. Judge Pitman reasoned that a Hague Convention request
was not an “avenue [that] is futile,”64 and noted that “it appears that the
Chinese courts have increased the execution of [Hague] requests over time .
. . . albeit at a rate that is likely not ideal for plaintiffs.”65 By contrast, Judge
Sullivan in Gucci disagreed; the fact that an avenue was not “futile” was not
sufficient to find in favor of BOC on factor four.66 The Gucci court was not
persuaded by BOC’s argument that the empirical data presented by the
plaintiffs were based in part on stale language from the Department of
State’s website, and thus, should be discounted. While Judge Sullivan
agreed with the Tiffany v. Qi court that “there is a dearth of information as
to the current efficiency” of Hague Convention requests in China, he
required affirmative evidence that China’s compliance with Hague
Convention requests had “dramatically improved,” and gave little weight to
the revision to the State Department’s website.67 Ultimately, the Gucci court
found that factor four favored the plaintiffs, reasoning that a Hague
Convention request was not a “viable alternative method.”68
Judge Sullivan seemed to read a likelihood of success qualification into
factor four—that the “availability of alternative means” needed to be
alternative means that were actually “viable” or likely to succeed. Judge
Sullivan’s more stringent definition of what constituted “alternative means”
under factor four was necessarily informed and influenced by his
determination that factor five, the balance of national interests, weighed in
favor of U.S. interests. In other words, because Judge Sullivan thought that
China’s interest in banking secrecy was “limited,” it was apparently easier
for him to require a stronger showing of China’s likelihood of compliance
with a Hague Convention request. Such an approach, in these authors’
opinions, underestimates China’s sovereignty and interest in protecting its
banks’ confidential information.
By contrast, because Judge Pitman found in Tiffany v. Qi that China’s
interest was “significant,”69 he was less willing to encroach on Chinese
sovereignty by requiring the Banks to comply with U.S. law (and thus,
violate Chinese law) unless alternative means of obtaining the desired
information through a Hague Convention request were futile. Furthermore,
in balancing the competing state interests, the Gucci court never recognized
63.
64.
65.
66.

See supra text accompanying note 39.
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 156.
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 23, 2011).
67. Id. at *9.
68. Id.
69. Tiffany v. Qi, 276 F.R.D. at 156, 160.
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that BOC was not actually a party to the litigation—a fact that the Tiffany v.
Qi court found strengthened China’s interest in enforcing banking laws that
protect its banks’ account holders’ confidentiality.70
While only so much can be extrapolated from comparing Gucci and
both of the Tiffany cases, a survey of the U.S. case law addressing other
countries’ conflicting bank secrecy laws reveals more. In an article on the
publicized 2009 United States v. UBS AG case,71 in which the U.S.
government went after Swiss bank accounts being used to evade federal
taxes, the author describes the case’s result as an “attack on Swiss banking
sovereignty.”72 In UBS, the parties ultimately arrived at a settlement
agreement in which UBS, a Swiss bank governed by Swiss bank secrecy
laws, would reveal account information concerning certain U.S. account
holders.73 The agreement departed from UBS’s initial position, which was
backed by the Swiss government, to withhold the names of U.S. account
holders who were UBS customers that had failed to meet federal tax
obligations.74 Even though UBS is distinguishable on several levels,75 the
characterization of the U.S. legal system’s disregard for Swiss banking laws
as an “attack” on Swiss sovereignty can be instructive in thinking about the
Gucci court’s willingness to sidestep Chinese banking law in favor of U.S.
discovery rules.
Because Chinese bank secrecy laws would be violated by enforcing
U.S. discovery rules in Tiffany v. Qi and Gucci, at first glance, the outcome
of each of these cases seems to necessarily prioritize the laws of one
sovereign to the detriment of the other’s legal system—in other words, by
finding in favor of the Banks, the Tiffany v. Qi court deferred to Chinese
sovereignty over U.S. sovereignty, while Gucci’s deference to U.S.
discovery rules infringed China’s sovereign interests in protecting its
depositors’ confidential information. However, comparing the degree of
harm to Chinese sovereignty in Gucci versus U.S. sovereignty in Tiffany v.
Qi reveals an important difference in the extent to which each sovereign’s
70. See id. at 158, 160.
71. United States v. UBS AG, No. 09 Civ. 20423, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009).
72. Beckett G. Cantley, The UBS Case: The U.S. Attack on Swiss Banking Sovereignty, 7
L.
&
MGMT.
REV.
1,
23–24
(2010–2011),
available
at
INT’L
http://www.cantleylaw.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25:the-ubs-casethe-us-attack-on-swiss-banking-sovereignty&catid=2:tax-articles.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Importantly, in UBS, the SEC sought Swiss bank accounts held by U.S. citizens, and under
an applicable U.S.-Swiss treaty, Switzerland has some obligations to disclose information related
to these accounts. See Press Release, U.S Dep’t of the Treas., Mutual Agreement of January 23,
2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S.
Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/mutual.aspx. Nevertheless, the treaty does not protect the Swiss
banks from their own laws; thus, a U.S. citizen could potentially bring a suit in a Swiss court
under Swiss laws against UBS for disclosing information. See Cantley, supra note 72, at 25. This
is the same problem that confronts the Chinese banks in the Tiffany cases and Gucci.
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interests are protected. Ultimately, the Tiffany v. Qi court did not preclude
the asserted U.S. interest in protecting and enforcing trademarks by finding
in favor of the Banks; rather, the court forced plaintiffs to use an
intermediary body—the Hague Convention—to obtain the information
sought in a way that would not contravene Chinese law. By contrast, the
Gucci opinion directly contravened China’s interest in protecting its bank
secrecy laws, and consequently, its interest in increasing consumer
confidence in its fledgling banking system. In other words, complying with
the U.S. subpoenas in each case means violating Chinese law, whereas
using the Hague Convention, to which the U.S. is a willing party, as an
alternative means to obtain information does not violate U.S. or Chinese
law while still advancing the United States’ sovereign interest in protecting
U.S. trademarks.
While one can reasonably question the certainty of successfully
obtaining documents under the Hague Convention in China, this uncertainty
should be insufficient to eschew China’s interest in its bank secrecy laws.
The Tiffany cases and the Gucci case portray this unfairness because, in
these cases, the banks themselves were not parties to the litigation and were
not alleged to have violated any U.S. laws.
As discussed above, the UBS case is only instructive insofar as it
illuminates a potential political rationale for the Gucci court’s decision to
order BOC to comply with U.S. federal discovery rules. Indeed, using the
UBS case as a frame of reference for how U.S. courts deal with non-party
foreign banks in discovery is unhelpful, since the facts of UBS are
dramatically different than those of both of the Tiffany cases and the Gucci
case. However, jurisprudence exists that allows one to identify differences
in how the courts evaluate cases with similar sets of facts, but involve banks
from Western countries.
In SEC v. Stanford International Bank Ltd,76 where a Swiss unit of
Paris-based bank Société Générale SA (“SG Suisse”) was a non-party
recipient of a discovery request under the FRCP, the Northern District of
Texas held that discovery should first proceed under the Hague Convention
“in the interest of comity.”77 Like the Chinese banks in the Tiffany cases
and the Gucci case, SG Suisse argued for utilizing discovery procedures
under the Hague Convention because compliance with the discovery
request under the FRCP would subject the bank and its employees to
penalties under Swiss law.78 While the Stanford International court aligned
with the Gucci court in assessing most of the comity factors, the discourse
76. SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd, 776 F. Supp. 2d 323 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
77. Id. at 342.
78. See Nolan Godberg, Third Party Discovery of Foreign Bank Records Should First Proceed
Under the Hague Convention, PROSKAUER (May 26, 2011), http://privacylaw.proskauer.com
/2011/05/articles/miscellaneous/third-party-discovery-of-foreign-bank-records-should-firstproceed-under-the-hague-convention/ (citing Stanford Int’l, 776 F. Supp. 2d 323).
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surrounding factors four and five—assessing alternative means of obtaining
the information and balancing competing national interests—differed
significantly.
In Stanford International, the court limited its discussion of factor four
to whether the documents sought could be geographically obtained
elsewhere, as opposed to whether the documents could be obtained through
other means (i.e., through a Hague Convention request as analyzed in each
of the Tiffany cases and the Gucci case).79 The court did not even mention
the Hague Convention until it addressed factor five.
The court found comity factor five neutral, stating that “the [Hague]
Convention inherently, and adequately, balances the competing sovereign
interests here because its use will benefit U.S. interests by providing the
needed evidence, and protect Swiss interests by avoiding intrusions upon
Swiss sovereignty.”80 The court first acknowledged the “compelling
interests at stake” of both the United States and Switzerland.81 Regarding
the Swiss banking laws, the court focused on Switzerland’s “long-standing .
. . tradition that places great value on the sovereign independence of the
nation . . . [which] is embodied in . . . bank secrecy statues that have the
legitimate purpose of protecting commercial privacy inside and outside
Switzerland.”82 However, the court refrained from balancing the competing
national interests at stake, which it saw as an “inherently political” inquiry,
and opined that courts “generally are not the proper bodies to weigh which
sovereign’s interests are more meritorious.”83 Ultimately, the court
determined that the Hague Convention itself embodied the legislative
decisions of both countries that had agreed to become signatories to the
Convention, and thus, necessarily struck the right balance and allowed both
U.S. and Swiss interests to be served.84
Although Stanford International was decided in the Fifth Circuit, it
predated both of the Tiffany cases and Gucci; yet, neither of the Tiffany
cases nor the Gucci case adopted, let alone addressed, Stanford
International’s language or analysis about the Hague Convention itself
striking a balance between competing national interests in factor five of the
comity analysis. Furthermore, the Chinese bank cases’ extensive discussion
of whether a Hague Convention request would be successful in Switzerland
was completely absent in Stanford International. Additionally, the court in
Stanford International found that Swiss banking laws had the “legitimate
purpose of protecting commercial privacy,” without mentioning and in spite

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Stanford Int’l, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 334–37.
Id. at 337 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 336.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 337.
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of the prior impropriety by Swiss bank UBS in United States v. UBS AG,85
which would otherwise suggest an illegitimate underside to Swiss banking
laws.
Both of the Tiffany cases and the Gucci case focus critically on whether
the Chinese government would respect a request for documents made under
the Hague Convention in determining factor four of the comity analysis—
i.e., in determining whether there are other means available for obtaining
the information requested. This inquiry is entirely absent from the
discussion of factor four in Stanford International, presumably because that
court found it unthinkable that the Swiss government would not comply
with the Hague Convention. Even in Tiffany v. Qi, where Judge Pitman
ultimately held that a Hague Convention request is an available alternative
means, the court reached this result only after an extensive analysis of
China’s history of noncompliance.86 Judge Sullivan’s determination in
Gucci that a Hague Convention request would not be “effective” in China,
however, produced more dramatic effects. Judge Sullivan, in relying on
scholarship based on the U.S. State Department’s retracted language about
China’s noncompliance, memorializes distrust of the Chinese government
in enforcing international treaties, a fact that may no longer be true.
Furthermore, in ignoring the bank’s non-party status, Judge Sullivan
seemed to project some culpability on the bank—as if it were partly to
blame for the counterfeiter’s profiting. The Gucci opinion reinforces the
notion of a counterfeiting culture in China and a government that is too lax
towards infringement of intellectual property rights. Finally, the opinion
suggests that Chinese interests and U.S. interests do not share common
ground87—unlike Swiss interests, which can be harmonized with U.S.
interests when the “right balance” is struck.88
Though the precedential effect of both Tiffany decisions and the Gucci
decision is unclear—as they may be cabined to Second Circuit
jurisprudence or simply to their individual facts—they reveal some
prevailing attitudes and anxieties about China as a member of today’s
increasingly global marketplace, and specifically, the Chinese government’s
role in adhering to international standards that are largely dictated by
Western countries in that marketplace. For example, in January 2012, This
American Life89 broadcasted an excerpt of Mike Daisey’s one-man
monologue, The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs. The episode, titled
Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory, alleged that there were unethical labor
85. Id. at 336.
86. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 153–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
87. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 WL 6156936, at *9–10
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011).
88. Stanford Int’l, 776 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
89. This American Life is a journalistic enterprise and weekly public radio show with about 1.8
million listeners nationwide. See About Us, THIS AM. LIFE, http://www.thisamericanlife.org/about
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
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practices at Apple’s Foxconn factory in China, including the employment of
underage workers and unsafe working conditions.90 As a result of the
allegations, the New York Times ran an incendiary piece titled The
iEconomy; In China, the Human Costs that are Built into an iPod that
painted Foxconn, which happens to be the largest private-sector employer
in China, as willfully blind to its unethical labor practices.91 On March 16,
2012, however, This American Life retracted Mr. Daisey and the Apple
Factory because its producers discovered that Daisey had lied during the
fact-checking process and the show could no longer “vouch for [the story’s]
truth.”92 Although the initial story was retracted, the damage to Foxconn’s
reputation had already been done.93
The Apple-Foxconn controversy shows the media’s readiness to accept
allegations of impropriety in Chinese business practices and the underlying
assumption that the Chinese government turns a blind eye to such practices.
The media’s characterization of the Apple-Foxconn controversy mirrors the
Gucci court’s unfavorable opinion in its attitude towards big business (or,
more specifically, banks) in China.
An article published by The Atlantic suggests why, with particular
regard to U.S.-China relations, media and law can easily shape one another.
There are vast differences in political systems and institutions, social
norms, [and] historical and cultural legacies . . . [between the U.S. and
China]. Mutual perceptions can get easily skewed, with real repercussions
for policy. . . . which can be reinforced and perpetuated over time through,
for example[], domestic media . . . .94

As China continues to increase its presence in the global marketplace,
these mutual perceptions come to surface through public discourse, such
as media and judicial opinions. Because the two Tiffany cases and the
Gucci case form part of this discourse, a closer look at the language and
rationale of these cases reveals the Western attitudes that exist towards,
inter alia, China’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation of

90. Ira Glass, Retracting “Mr. Daisey and the Apple Factory,” THIS AM. LIFE BLOG (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/blog/2012/03/retracting-mr-daisey-and-the-apple-factory/.
91. David Barboza & Charles Duhigg, The iEconomy; In China, the Human Costs that are
Built into an iPad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res
=9C02E2D71438F935A15752C0A9649D8B63&pagewanted=all.
92. See Glass, supra note 90.
93. Because of the media frenzy that ensued after the American Life episode, Apple enlisted
the U.S. Fair Labor Association (FLA) to conduct an investigation into the working conditions at
the factory, and while Daisey’s allegations were not confirmed, the FLA found that workers were
working significantly longer hours than the legal limit in China. Juliette Garside, Apple’s
Factories in China are Breaking Employment Laws, Audit Finds, GUARDIAN, Mar. 30, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/mar/30/apple-factories-china-foxconn-audit.
94. Damien Ma, Friend/Foe: The Contradictions in How Americans and Chinese See Each
Other, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 13, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive
/2012/07/friend-foe-the-contradictions-in-how-americans-and-chinese-see-each-other/259710/.
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intellectual property infringement and the validity of China’s interest in
its bank secrecy laws.
CONCLUSION
By validating expert testimony suggesting that the Chinese government
drags its feet when presented with a Hague Convention request, the Gucci
court gives this skeptical impression the imprimatur of fact, in spite of
evidence that the Chinese government is changing its noncompliant ways.
The Tiffany v. Qi court, on the other hand, while engaging with the same
analytical questions as the Gucci court, presents a forward-thinking vision
for China’s role as a member of the global community. By ordering a
request through the Hague Convention rather than forcing strict compliance
with U.S. discovery rules in violation of Chinese law, the court challenges
the view that the Chinese government refuses to enforce international
business standards and acknowledges that times are changing, with China
taking its role as a Hague Convention signatory more seriously. The Tiffany
v. Forbse court perhaps presents the most impartial view to date: by
refusing to assume that a Hague Convention request would prove unfruitful
until concrete evidence is provided after a suitable time period of noncompliance by Chinese banks, this court shows cautious optimism as to
China’s improving participation as a member of the international
community while not entirely ignoring China’s past record.

